Civilized societies, capitalist or Communist, have "settled down" to accepting as a matter of course, particular differentials and magnitudes in earning rates, in taxation, in interest on money, in profit from management, in expectations of leisure from work, in insurance, and many other economic habits. But most citizens — including bankers — would have no idea at all how to defend these particular interpretations of ethical values in economics by any rational principle. An economist can "explain" them on seemingly tolerable reliable empirical economic laws, but he cannot understand them on broader social psychological principles, nor has he any systematic principles whereby he can justify his manipulations in terms of human rights and moral expectations. Meanwhile we are only half aware that there are quite extensive ethical implications in the currently accepted economic habits of society. The question we now ask is "What are they?" And how would an explicit Beyondist morality set out to justify or modify them?
The principle has been stated above (Chapter 7, Section 7.7) that since economic laws reflect more basic energy and real resource laws extending through our environment, these economic laws need to be respected as if more than merely man-made, by any Beyondist morality that wishes to keep integrated with the realities of evolution. (Few social psychologists except Thorndike (1939) incidentally, have seen the importance of studying these economics-psychology integrations.) It was recognized that in stating this, inherent adjustive realism of sheer economic laws one enters sharp conflict with Humanism and with a revealed religion such as Christianity, which at times has denied the right to collect interest and has wished to fix wages socialistically by standards unrelated to the service given. The response of Beyondism is that such adjustments to economic laws are entirely justified for Type A poverty — accidental or associated with temporary fluctuations in the needs of society — but that the charity of Type B poverty — due to systematic failure of individuals to contribute to society — is an unfortunate, immoral deviation, best kept entirely temporary.
Ideas of "controlling the economy" are quite old. They were tried in Egypt and Athens. Both church and state proposed schemes in the Middle Ages. Extensive controls were tried and abondoned in the French Revolution, and so on. Mostly they have been — until the twentieth century — attempts to get something from nothing — to satisfy the clamor of a "pressure group". The important points are that though the economy can be effectively regulated only by understanding its mechanisms, it can be wisely regulated only by moral principles that fit the total realities of life on our planet.
As to the beginnings of a rationale for wage differentials it was suggested above that one must begin with the courage to accept Ricardo's recognition that a man's offering of his work is, at least basically, a "commodity" on the market. (Let us remind the reader that economics defines a commodity as "any object embodying human labor for which there is a social demand.") And like any other its value is naturally set by supply and demand. (If society is not wise enough to pay the researcher and the priest, and other providers of services not immediately valuable, as in the temporarily unemployed who stands and waits, it is so much the worse for the given society.)
Now it is recognized that these wage differentials are sufficient motivation for the sensible man (a) to make the effort of education for more needed jobs when others needing less education are overcrowded, (b) to migrate from areas of low to higher demand, and to pursue various other adjustments valuable to society. It is only through the Beyondist comprehensive inclusion of genetic and environmental determiners, however, that we come to see that wage differentials are also a signal (under (a) above) for genetic supply and demand adjustments. In deliberately illustrating this here in regard to the innate component in intelligence we are not ignoring the environmental educational component. But for brevity of presentation we shall suppose that the aim of our present educational system, i.e., of giving longer education to the more intelligent, has been achieved, so that a correlation of unity exists between genetic and educational contributions to the individual's level of effectiveness.
Now let us suppose a society in equilibrium for which two histograms (graphs showing verically the frequencies of people at each intelligence level, as measured horizontally) are constructed. One (Fig. 8.1) shows the amount of supply of intelligence, by birth rate, at each level (left to right), and the other shows the demand. Since a population with the initially given distribution of born intelligence has actually generated the jobs which characterize that culture we may suppose that supply and demand are initially in equilibrium. That is to say, there are in the adjusted state, with as many "clever" (demanding) jobs as there are clever people, and simple jobs as simple people. The two histograms (smoothed to "distribution curves") will fit closely, as shown in Fig. 8.1(a).
But from this point of cultural equilibrium onward the two curves can become dislocated by either (a) the birth rates becoming significantly different at different intelligence levels, or (b) the demand in the economy for jobs at different levels of required intelligence-education becoming different through cultural invention, e.g., more computer program writers and fewer ditch diggers may now be required.
The first effect of such a dislocation as is shown in Fig. 8.1(b) will be to change the reward rates (theoretically all being equally paid in Fig. 8.1); and a secondary result may be to create unemployment. Wolfle's examination (1971) of national resources of talent is here useful. If the wages offered are a simple function of the ratio of demand to supply, and if we take this ratio from Fig. 8.1(b) for a series of baseline points projected upward to the pair of curves "present demand-present supply," we shall get the curve derived in Fig. 8.2(a) for wages resulting at each intelligence level. Taking population distribution into account we then obtain a resulting distribution of earning rates as shown in Fig. 8.2 (b). Actually this fits in general form the earning distribution that has characterized our society for a generation or more. That is to say, there is no longer either a rectangular or a normal distribution of earnings, but a relative excess of persons either at a low earning level or in unemployed dependence.
A more desirable adjustment to such a situation is not to be reached by attention to education alone. Indeed, the recommentations here coincide with those we have reached in the section on eugenics above, namely, that birth rates should be adjusted to earnings as fixed in the open market. Family planning must respond to the distribution of total community family planning needs, not merely to the need to adjust size of population. That is to say, the birth rates need to be sensitively adjusted according to the best estimates of the trend of complexity of occupations occurring in our culture.
Instead of such a morally desirable adjustment, however, society is cajoled politically into "charitably" sustaining the economic burden of an "hospitalized enclave" in an otherwise healthy society, occasioned by a largely unemployable group — relative to the demands of new cultural complexities. Indeed, this group now has a state supported high birth rate calculated to increase the dislocation. This parasitic burden we shall discuss in other connections below. Meanwhile, any realistic ethical system must regard a man who begets eight children on public welfare as someone as socially dangerous as any criminal. And in general, the attempt by economists to gloss over this inherent poverty by paying out in response to the social blackmail ("disgraceful poverty in an affluent society") involved is an anathema to any thinking citizen. The remedy by "affluence" merely hides a more serious disease.
A second economic "way of life" that is accepted without enquiry, and which it is vital to discuss because of its powerful effects on evolutionary trends is that of taxation on various differential bases. It seems nowadays to be widely accepted that a larger income and also a larger (total or luxury) expenditure should be more heavily taxed than a smaller one. The latter — the tax on expenditures — incidentally, has a usefulness lacked by the former in permitting a government to discourage morally less desirable modes of expenditure. One would have thought that the sales tax would therefore be urged, relative to income tax, by economists with broader vision. Indeed, the desirability-undesirability principle of tax planning has the advantage it can be extended to tax those who do not help produce the next generation, thus in effect giving the proceeds to those who expend on bringing up children.
As regards income tax — especially as a tax merely aimed at reducing the income differential (quite regardless of birth rates) — we propose to throw aside traditional habits of acceptance and ask open-mindedly just what the rationale and moral values are in setting up any "leveling" taxation. There is, of course, a considerable amount of Utopian writing (and actual practice, e.g., in monasteries, in the kibbutz of Israel, and in some Communist groups) explicitly favoring re-distributions by agreed taxations with the aim essentially of bringing all to the same net earning level. A justification often advanced for such leveling down is that of Russell (1955, page 109): "The main objection to an uneven distribution [of earnings] is that it causes envy and hatred in the less fortunate, leading to fear and correlative hatred in the more fortunate." Good taste and human feeling would certainly forbid the kind of conspicuous expenditure in display which Veblen (1899) criticized, but maintaining moderate differences of resources for living is a different matter, and the Beyondist ethic on envy (page 156 [Chapter 4.7]) is vitally addressed to assuring this possibility of differences without tension in a good society.
Any argument for bringing individuals of all ages and competences to absolutely the same earning level (or, for that matter, expenditure level) encounters insurmountable objections in any complex society. In an evolutionary framework, there are mainly two objections: (a) genetically, that this denies the economic aid we have just discussed for a differential birth rate adjusted to competence, and (b) environmentally, that it does not provide incentive for facing unusual demands in a job or the uphill pull in education necessary for reaching competence for more complex jobs. (It seems to be demonstrated in Russia, for example, that free higher level education still does not attract enough doctors, engineers, and so forth, unless the pay in the job is also higher.)
The aim of producing at least a comparative leveling of incomes through a differential income tax, on the other hand, is widely exemplified in various countries. The fact that it is taken for granted is assumed by many, e.g., Fulbright, quoted below, to mean that it is felt to be just, and that it is good for the group. The historical fact, however, is that the acceptance of the idea of a leveling tax has never been universal, and the current acceptance is quite recent. For example, as Darlington points out (1969) a single standard tax for all citizens was characteristic of Rome, consistent with their general ethos of equal national and civic duty by all citizens. Further, he points out that it aided the outward movement of colonists, since those who could not support the tax moved from the center of civilization to regions where it was not collected. This was a pointed remedy for the urban slum! In both Europe and the U.S.A. the differential income tax has no antiquity — an equal "poll tax" being, for many generations, most widely accepted as the model of a tax. Income tax, differential or non-differential, is only two to five generations old.
The rational basis for tax collection of any kind, which in some form is as ancient as civilization, is that certain services — education, postal service, military defense, etc. — being impracticable for private enterprise (requiring essentially a monopoly), and beyond the foresight and willingness of many citizens to organize provision for their own needs, had to be centrally organized and supported by taxes. Though instituted as much in democracies as other governments, taxation is authoritarian. For in effect the government says, "Since you cannot spend your money wisely, we will take it and provide what good community opinion thinks you ought to have; and you cannot spend money elsewhere until this tax is collected."
On this basis of payment for common services, which — as concerns indispensable services — is obviously just and necessary, it is difficult to find any reason (assuming that the earning differential is based, in the first place, as analyzed above, on contribution to the real needs of the community) for charging one person more than another for the same services. The person of average income does not use more street lighting or free education or free medical service than the person of sub-average income. There is certainly no basis in the general priniciple of egalitarianism for charging one man more than another for having his children taught in the same school, and so on. Yet a radical United States Senator (Fulbright, 1967, page 223) rhetorically argues that: "In America and other democractic countries, higher income people provide the bulk of the tax money to finance public services of which the poor are the prinicipal beneficiaries; the redistribution of wealth has become a normal and accepted function of democratic government. The rich pay, not as private act of noblesse oblige, but in fulfillment of a social responsibility; the poor receive benefits, not as a lucky gratuity, but as the right of citizens...." (Italics ours).
Here is the whole crass assumption brought out into the open, with all its lack of analytical thought and without a blush for its lack of any fundamental imagination. The oratory in such cases usually conveys that the inference to "the rich" is to some man so rich that he won't miss the tax, and that in any case it must be "unearned" income. The reality that a politician ought to be talking about, however (oratorical tricks like "rich" aside) is not three percent of excessively rich men, but that fifty percent of the population — those above a hard-earned meager average, whom Fulbright and his kind are taxing to pay what they can ill afford to a less industrious or competent fifty percent below the average earning. If one looks at this situation with a fresh mind ("cleared of cant" as Dr. Johnson would say); this is the central fact, though some rationale for current tax practice can perhaps be sought in the following: (1) that regardless of responsibility to pay, taxes cannot be taken from those who simply do not have anything, i.e., who have neither earned nor saved; (2) that, where the relative have-nots perceive themselves as sixty percent rather than forty percent, i.e., when they have a wrong idea of the median earning (such as Fulbright encourages above), they are numerous enough, by revolution or ballot box, to enforce the heavier tax on the lesser fraction. This implies that the higher tax is a sop to reduce to a safe level that envy which Bertrand Russell and other Humanists consider an acceptable covetousness; (3) that the payment of a heavier tax is a willing act of charity, motivated by Christian or other traditional attitudes to "the poor;" (4) that the tax is a realistic but indirect payment for services in as much as the more able depend on the presence of the less able for the proper working of a total society.
Not one of these can logically face the standards of evolutionary morality and the last is sheer farce (the less able depend even more on the presence of the more able). Let us return to argue this for (2) and (3) but meanwhile return to the brute expediency argued in (1). The reader may find it interesting to try the experiment, as I have done, of asking a dozen or so intelligent and thoughtful men what they consider the justice of taking the larger tax from the man who earns more. After the usual period of speechlessness, characteristic of a custom accepted without thought, my friends usually answer (1), (2) or (3) above, but, pressed, they invariably return to the unassailable position that the man who has spent (or never earned) what he owes cannot be made to pay. Even the remedy which held historically until recently — putting the debtor to work — would not work too well here, since, by definition — in the case of the unemployed — he would cost more to keep than his work is worth in the open market!
As to the third rationale for a graded tax — that it is charity (in thin disguise) — the answer must consistently be what we have already made — that Type A but not Type B poverty is worthy of it. Under Type A one would include the undertaxing of the young, on a scale indicated by an allowance proportional to the typical increase of earning to be expected by a person of the given competence with age, since the professions in particular earn negligibly to say, age twenty-seven. There is no reason why, with suitable corrections such as this, the national income should not be maintainable with a flat income tax rate, for the bulk of it at present comes not from a few high taxes, but from the mass of averagely paying citizens. The proposed reform would in practice only deny cars and families to a minority by requiring them to pay their due debt to society before entering on other expenditures. In this connection sooner or later we have to recognize explicitly the dividing line which any intelligent observer already recognizes — that between free men who earn their way in their society, and the obligated ten percent who are nursed and supervised by social welfare and do not in fact, have citizenship status as it is defined by the contributing majority. The demand to pay a fixed tax would simply be one more criterion of this status.
In the second rationale for a graded tax — that it gives less provocation in the sin of envy — there hides cowardice, but perhaps also two more defensible arguments: (a) That a society which does not treat its members charitably at all times, regardless of causes of the misfortunes, will lose certain "defectors" and will not obtain from the average citizen the degree of loyalty found in societies that are infinitely succorant. The briefest consideration of societies that have been particularly tough on their citizens — Sparta, Japan (whose soldiers were always ready to die rather than surrender in World War II), and even some Christian orders such as the Carthusians — strongly suggests that the result of severity is not always a revolt against society. What happens depends on the possession by society of a very positive morale for other reasons. A psychologically rather subtle further possibility seriously deserves research: that although stern loyalty is still compatible with a non-pampering society, certain forms of imaginative creativity occur more freely in a completely compassionate and protective society, since some creative minds are childlike. (b) Not only in this economic realm, but in all problems of succour of individuals by society, one has to consider what is really a special Type A misfortune. This is the situation where for a combination of reasons the individual has "sulked" from society and what can only be called redemptive action is called for, e.g., in the modern hippie, certain criminals, the drug taker, and others. It could well be argued that society does well to rid itself of such individuals whose departure is no loss. A professional student of the problem surveying the recent appalling spread of heroin addiction, among individuals who have refused to listen to every plea of reasoning authority pointing out the dangers before they were "hooked," concludes that society really has no alternative but to let these individuals proceed to the last, largest and fatal dose. On the other hand, a Beyondist could argue — and here the conclusion would be the same as the Christian view-- that the potential value to society of many a prodigal, redeemed and transformed, is so great as to justify enormous expenditures of affection and patience in a redemptive, rehabilitative undertaking. If we are to approach this objectively it might, on the other hand, turn out, alas, that in a fair proportion of obdurate cases society would actually be better off by spending its resources on new human material. This is the kind of "extreme case that makes bad law," but it brings out, in the economic field, the fact that the individual who cannot make his contribution to society could conceivably be supported on the rational basis of temporary rehabilitative action.
But apart from such exceptions under reason (2) (reasons (3) and (4) are rejected as untenable), it is difficult to find a rational basis for a highly uneven taxation designed to transfer wealth to a less competent half of the population. The operative reason in (2), apart from the rehabilitation reason in (2b), is purely tactical: to prevent secession (such as actually occurred several times in history — in Wat Tyler's rebellion, the starving bandits who roamed Russia in the early twenties, and the pirates of the Mediterranean and China Seas).
In questioning endless charities from one fraction of society to another one is not overlooking that such exchanges in special cases may be necessary parts of the functioning of a complex social organism. The charity of parents to children has such functionality; but even that can be overdone. And so we reach the old problem, when does functionality end and the blasphemy which is parasitism begin? In the present case, among citizens all performing more or less required tasks and having equal citizenship rights, where is the rationale for taking from that half which can perform more demanded and paid tasks and giving to the group less unquestionably contributing, or even "slacking"? The body, wiser than political man, gives most nutrition to the muscles most in action.
It would seem, granted that the social organism is in a tolerably effective state of functioning — in education, research, food supply, defense, etc. — that the best criterion we have of the need for reinforcement in any part is the scarcity of people performing in that part, relative to demand. And in an economy with any degree of flexibility this will show by higher earnings there, and by poverty in the types of people least needed. Yet Fulbright, lacking in any clear principles, blandly states above that those earning more must provide "the bulk of the tax" and that "the poor receive benefits," not as charity "but as the right of citizens." He has not demonstrated this as a right, but at least by asserting it he has illustrated the confusion prevailing in popular thought and the need for a basic re-examination of why certain economic customs are tolerated, in the field of earnings and taxation.
If a differential earning is adjustive (and indeed an indication of where we need to produce more people to reduce the differential) then an artificial reduction of this basic adjustive action by a "corrective" tax is a contribution to the inefficiency of the social organism. (And in some cases as dangerous as putting a muffler over an air raid siren, or increasing competing noises.) A "single value" tax, unless it can be demonstrated that some people benefit more than others from the communal services, would not only be morally more just, but infinitely less costly of everyone's time in the expensive, time consuming business of collection.
This last is no small matter, but the main argument against the complex differential, and for the simplicity of a single flat rate for all citizens beyond school, is that in this way economic custom could be made to assist the spread of (a) more advanced cultural habits and (b) better genetic endowment (by the life test), throughout the given society. It would do so through increasing the reward for the first and the survival value for the second. An easy going individual, unwilling entirely to accept the above argument of the falseness of charity, may argue that within the bulk of society — say the middle eighty percent by income — the penalty paid by the upper half to the lower half is so slight as to work no ill. But "trash for over-topping" as Shakespeare reminded us, in times when weights were hung around the necks of the faster fox-hounds in order that the slower pack might keep up, can be very wearying by the end of a long run — and the slower pack may not catch the fox. The verdict of all careful studies on natural selection is that the elimination of one breed and its replacement by another takes place with suprising speed in biological time from quite a small handicap or disadvantage, if steadily continued. The fact is that we do not know how far these artificial handicaps which society now imposes affect, for example, birth rates, health, longevity, or the readiness of citizens to maintain the better earning habits. Does the five hundred dollars per annum taken from the teacher and given to the unskilled factory attendant make just the difference between the former having a two child and a one child family and the latter arguing his children into more effort in school? By contrast, to the dubious habit of taxing by income, the imposition of taxation on expenditures, assisting those who adjust to more desirable ideals and penalizing extravagance and vice is a most valuable economic tool in an evolutionary morality.
Another economic practice which needs more research as to its social effects is insurance. When private and voluntary, and still more when governmental and compulsory, it means that those who are careless in living habits, or suffering minor hereditary defects productive of accident and illness are enabled to reproduce at no lesser rate than those who are not. Again the trouble arises from confounding Type A and Type B "misfortunes." Insurance was set up for, and performs a valuable function in, giving peace of mind regarding uncontrollable calamities that may occur to any man. It finishes up, however, by being involved also in Type B "misfortunes": those where the apparent bad luck is systematically related to the qualities of the person. The good driver with no accident in fifty years pays for the drunken driver who regularly smashes up his sports car — or an innocent pedestrian. In this category we must logically, but less happily include the individual with hereditary disease, for which morally he has no responsibility (though his parents have). There is no escaping the fact that health insurance is a tax on the healthy to support the unhealthy, and in so far as the differences are perhaps one-half due to Type B, systematic causes, it is systematically increasing (or preventing the reduction) of disabilities of that kind.
An illustration is provided by the recent report of the National Haematological Society to the effect that keeping one haemophiliac functioning by injections costs $22,000 per year. Now the Beyondist morality is quite clear that any society, for spiritual solidarity, takes care of its defectives. But the cost of a defect (much less than the above clear instance) would normally result in the family concerned having a lower reproduction rate, by a socially beneficient self-adjustment to economic consequences. But insurance removes the connection. The effect may be small, but operating over the millions in a typical national population, it must significantly reduce the elimination of genes bearing various defects. It is not argued, of course, that the main tranquilizing effects of insurance should be foregone because of these undesirable side effects, but only that a problem is created by them and that steps should be taken to reduce the problem. For example, the person with high medical costs through inheritable disabilities should be persuaded to have a smaller family, and the high risk driver should be moved by penalties introduced into insurance to learn to drive or be prohibited from driving. Since insurance must be retained, the argument is for more individually-adjusted, differential premiums. This is not impracticable granted good social recording and psychological measurement — and would continue that humane and graduated implementation of natural selection by economic means which we have already reason to believe would function well in the single value tax and the maintenance of income differentials.
In all three of these fields the cost of not making internal group economic customs maximally functional in a Beyondist sense (and leaving them to the expediency of accidental, traditional social values) will ultimately turn up in having to put the weight of natural selection more upon inter-group than inter-individual survival. Unfortunately, the reckoning between groups is both less efficient per century and more likely to to bring risk of war. Meanwhile, every group which does not eliminate by internal natural selection carries a parasitic burden, eventually largely translated into economic terms, e.g., appearing as reduced power to export, as inflation, or as decline of exchange rate for the national currency — and so on. We have pointed out above that the differentials in this burden may, from an evolutionary standpoint, function usefully in lieu of war, in that the burden when high may so interfere with maintenance of defense that a country perceives it must lose a war and, in essence, surrenders without a war. However, it may also interfere with international scientific advance, as in America in the last decade, where the combined effect of the social burden and war costs began to lose America the lead it had, and the contribution it made, relative to Russia in interplanetary exploration. In that brief period (1960-1970) welfare to families with dependent children increased from $3.5 million to nearly $9 million (Time, February 8, 1971), a staggering threefold increase of the burden in one decade. President Johnson was prepared to say the true if unpopular thing when he insisted in the middle of this period (June 25, 1965, United Nations Anniversary Ceremony), "Let us face the fact that less than $5 invested in birth control is worth $100 invested in economic support." Incidentally, the parasitic burden is not all accumulated defect or immoral behavior in the ordinary sense, and may include habits of "genteel avoidance" of work. As Hardin (1964) has said, "The recurring inflations which France has suffered are an economic consequence of the excessive burden of pensions and other overhead costs which an aging country has to carry."
If space permitted, a brief analysis should be made of the interaction of economic and moral values in migration. Whenever a country manages its affairs well it is likely to experience a rise in standard of living which then makes it an attractive haven for migrants, often from the less successful of other countries. The question which then arises is whether purely economic laws should hold sway, and permit migration, or whether the idealism of a country in pursuing its own culturo-genetic experiment should override economics. Britain, in terms of migration from Jamaica and former colonies; the U.S. in relation to Mexican labor; Germany in relation to Italian immigration; Australia and the masses of Indo-China; all face grave decisions. If one agrees with Shakespeare about "this happy breed of men" who made English culture a force for good around the world, he will hesitate to be a party to changing it at its very source, without research to gain far more knowledge than we now have about the social effects.
Migration is not immediately a racial matter, but hinges on the fact that cultural habits clearly persist in families over three or four generations, and may persist indefinitely. Consequently, before inviting immigrants on a large scale every culture should weigh the desirability of changing its culture in the way that will inevitably follow. The change may be desirable; it may be undesirable; but it will be real. Also, it should consider the alternative of expanding its own birth rate to supply the needed increase in population, as opposed to experiencing that damping down of its own birth rate that will adaptively follow from an invasion.
With the growth of a fuller understanding of evolutionary ethics, and with far greater knowledge of genetic and social psychological knowledge than we yet have, both cultural and genetic migration and blending will undoubtedly be carried out with far more deliberate and advantageous choice than has been exercised until now. With this will go a firm understanding of the rights of peoples to reject any merely economic determination of migration — as by employers seeking immediate cheap labor regardless of later welfare costs to the community. Instead, with scientific knowledge and a democratic vote, they will choose their preferred immigrants. There is no such "right," as some universalistic religious ethics wish to claim, to complete individual freedom of migration into all societies, uninvited. Each has its own precious experiment to nurture and stand by, in the branching out and general differentiation of human societies.
Our concern in this section has nevertheless been primarily with a revisionary approach to the economic customs determining distribution of support within the group. The main issues of between-group economic differentials have probably already become clear through discussion of the functions of economic competition in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. The economic standing of a group is very much a function of its psychological qualities. The first correlational analysis of the associates of higher real standard of living in modern nations (Cattell, Breul and Hartmann, 1952) shows surprisingly little causation by the luck of "natural resources." (Bahrein is an extreme exception.) Instead we find two major factors involved, one of which has already been discussed (page 137) as the effect of the intelligence and educational level of the people, while the other seems to be some as yet not easily interpreted temperament association with such culture patterns as the Protestant ethic, such as one would expect from Max Weber's analysis. (Data on percentage of Jewish affiliation was not available for correlation in that research, but in Adelson's longitudinal (1950) factor analysis this percentage also positively related itself to standard of living.) These two factors together — ability level and culture pattern — suggest, however, that the productivity of a community, and its mean standard of living relative to others, rest on moral and intellectual strengths — indeed on such as would be steadily produced from a Beyondist ethics. Data permitting exploring the relation of living standard to the parasitic burden, and to the motivational effect of wage differentials was also not available, so the purely empirical analyses must at present leave our arguments above with the status of hypotheses.
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