When the newspapers play up the game of "right wing" versus "left wing," and the young form into Fascist and Communist battalions, the investigator of the real dimensions of disagreement can only cry, like the falling Mercutio, "a plague on both their houses." Quite apart from whatever rational and real dimensions can scientifically be discovered for political directions of diverse movement as such, the psychologist has found clear evidence that sheer personal temperament dimensions rather than objective data determine an appreciable amount of political decision. The temperament dimension descriptively labelled tough realism versus tender-minded sentimentality (I factor, premsia, in technical terms; Hall and Lindzey, 1970) seems to decide voting on treatment of criminals much more than any evidence on how effective different treatments are. Similarly, the degree of personal integration of the self-sentiment (Q3 factor; see Cattell and Butcher, 1968) is important in young voters in deciding their degree of acceptance of social values. The conservativism-vs-radicalism factor, Q1, is a personality factor which self-consciously determines the individual to see himself as radical or conservative, and according to his score he tends to "buy the book" of radical or conservative voting, without examination of the real merits of the items. For example, the radical votes for a change to the metric system, and a switch to looser sex behavior, though to a social scientific examination these may have a very different status. Similarly the overprotected I+ (premsic) individual is found, as a function of his temperament, to vote against even a defensive war and to vote for abolition of capital punishment, despite the inconsistency in that a take-over by a foreign power might mean wholesale "capital punishment" for democratic opposition.
Another unmistakable indication of the distance that we still have to go in bringing political interests and political categories closer to social scientific realities is the divorce in methods and concepts between students interested in politics and students interested in science. Only very slowly is really scientific thought being brought to bear on political choices and categories. A recent revealing symptom of the state of mind of those who at present follow political science has appeared through observations of the confused disturbances on college campuses over the last decade. The more emotional parades of violence have proved to be recruited more from literary and political science departments than from engineering, science and medicine. The latter have certainly been equally concerned to bring a more progressive and scientific rationality to social affairs, but have tended to investigate in terms of more realistic principles rather than demonstrate. The study of rowdy demonstrations seems to place much present political "science" with the emotional, intuitive and prejudiced (emotionally pre-judged) approaches.
As a more direct personal experience the present writer has to admit thirty years of disappointment in attempting to get political science interested in quantitative and basic social psychological group research, instead of "history" or journalism. After joining the Academy of Political Science and reading its quarterly journal hopefully from about 1940 to 1960, he reluctantly concluded that for most writers and teachers it remains a display of opinion and philosophy rather than a development of the quantitative science which a social psychologist would be interested in trying to build. As far as I can recollect, I never saw any numbers in this journal except at the top corners of the pages!
Perhaps the main thrust of the substantial constructive literature of political science is taxonomic, demonstrating that in the past and in the present virtually every conceivable major type of political government is successfully in operation somewhere around the world. Dictatorships by individuals, "dictatorships" by parties, oligarchies by power groups, oligarchies of selected elites, theocracies, would-be-classless democracies in which democracy has a religious quality, as in the U.S., and democracies compatible with class, in which democracy is a system of voting, as in Britain; also various instances of tribal government, and so on through a fine catalogue of types of systems. Indeed, one indication from this data is that the form of political organization might have less effect on the rest of culture, e.g., on personal freedom and economic opportunity, than is often supposed by those preoccupied with politics!
 The objections offered to most of these non-democratic systems by thoughtful people are well known. For example, in the U.S. Congress on April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson (at that time expressing no comparable doubts about the working of democracy) had complete doubts about oligarchy. He pointed out that "Cunningly contrived plans of ... aggression, carried it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from light only within ... the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs." Presumably, the capacity of an oligarchy to plan beyond the whims of popular opinion in a particular generation regarding these undesirable strategic aggressions and defenses would also extend equally, however, to valuable and desirable social and general construction, such as was accomplished, despite meager popular enthusiasm, architecturally in Athens, artistically in Florence, and in the centuries-long building of the great cathedrals by a religious oligarchy.
 A very common misuse of slogans and catchwords for example in student and journalistic debate is presented in, for example, the confusion of "authoritarian" and "dictatorial" in relation to government. The latter, of course, refers today to single person government — what Plato and Aristotle would have called a tyrant, though in intention the "Fuhrer" or Doge may be benevolent rather than tyrannical. An authoritarian government can, by contrast, be democratic, as the Communists would declare the governments of Russia and China to be. The Catholic Church would also declare itself authoritarian but not a dictatorship — since its College of Cardinals qualifies the infallibility of the Pope. "Democratic," as the quite different use in Russia indicates, (East Germany is democratic: West Germany is not!) has also become scarcely a meaningful word for any realistic, precise, international discussion. For example, in the United States and one or two other countries, it means — to the confusion of the rest of the world — merely a political party. In East Germany, it is made synonymous with Communistic. Above, we have defined it basically as a mode of reaching decisions by equal voting power. To many Americans and Scandinavians, again, it seems also to represent a religion, having to do with high valuation of the individual soul and individuality; and as such, it becomes an historical Nordic culture equivalent of Christianity.
The real social scientist, struggling to apply research to social structure and to discern desirable new directions of political construction finds his struggle toward precision baffled by the present coinage of terms. Though admitting that some meaning can be given, as just indicated, to democracy and that a rough meaning for "practical Communism" and "practical Fascism" may have been given by Stalin and Mussolini, the social psychologist making a fresh approach finds the continued use of these terms inapplicable. He has to cut across massive vortices of debate completely irrelevant to the scientific issues, reminding him, as one said, of trying to reach his laboratory on the afternoon when crowds are streaming to a university football game.
A perennial confusion which waylays the young — and sometimes the mature — is that mentioned above which identifies "progressiveness" with the have-not group and "conservatism" with the haves (say, the Republican Party in the U.S.A.). There is no logical reason why, say, the ownership of a factory should make a man less progressive than his workmen. Historically, in Britain for example, some of the most progressive measures in the support of science, of education, of family planning, etc., have been the work of the conservative "managerial" party. (At the moment, for example, it is the labour party that is opposing the integration of Britain into a common effective economic unit with the rest of Europe.) The accidental and illogical basis of have-nots being labelled progressive is that most of the possible changes in the distribution of property would naturally take it from those who now have it (and democracy is easily perverted into a system for legalized robbery at the polls). But "progressive" should obviously apply to some truly new designs benefiting the community as a whole, not to a dreary see-saw of alternating mutual exploitations. Yet the confidence trick of calling the less skilled, lower-earning occupational groups (the left wing) the "progressives" is repeated upon each susceptible new generation.
 This term is adopted by most writers since 1930 for precise description of what is aimed at by such artificial insemination ("test tube babies" to the journalist) as has a eugenic purpose. Thus a father remote in space or time, chosen for outstanding abilities and social dedication, e.g., a Nobel Prize winner, a great social leader, is enabled (see proposals in Muller, 1966, and Graham, 1970) to contribute a relatively large number of children, e.g., mainly, at present, through fatherhood in families where sterility of the husband frustrates the desire for children.
Also among the more "far out" proposals we must consider what Haldane called chromosomal engineering (recently popularized by the Nobel Prize winner Lederberg (1969) under the name "euphenics" with some dissent from other Nobel Prize winners such as Beadle (1963; Sturtevant and Beadle, 1964)). Although attempts directly to change the chromosome structure are likely to achieve technical physiological success before very long, we should in all realism note that even if manipulation of genes were achieved tomorrow, the second and indispensable part of the research necessary for such an undertaking, finding social behavior connections, as described above — would still remain to be done.
A related purely technical advance likely to have substantial utility in negative eugenics is the increasing ability of medicine to recognize chemical and structural defects in the foetus, e.g., by amniocentesis and thus produce beneficial abortion (see particularly Arehart, 1971a,b).
Here too, in the last resort the genes themselves (in the last case in their earliest foetal expression) have to be related to final social and cultural expressions. In short, chromosomal engineering and foetal detection are real advances, but the greater part of the research task remains, namely, the full evaluation of the psychological and physiological advantage of the chromosomal change produced. In view of the immense complexity of having to work out not only the advantage to the individual but also the effect on a complex society of a particular ability or temperament change, one must recognize that "chromosomal engineering" has only accomplished much the smaller, more mechanical part of its aims when the molecular geneticists themselves are through with mapping and manipulating the genes.
 While on the subject of critics let us attend to a number of spurious or misunderstood technical arguments against eugenics. Prominent among them one finds such as: (1) if a defect is recessive we cannot get rid of it; (2) when a homozygous form is undesirable a heterozygous form involving the same gene is often advantageous; (3) that since any actual capacity is partly inherited and partly a product of education, selection on the basis of the phenotype "produces no genetic selection." The answer to the first is that we can still advance but far more slowly. To the second let us respond by a realistic substitution of "very occasionally" for "often." The third appears mainly in the writings of crassly environmentalist sociologists. A comparatively sober statement of this kind occurs in M. Gordon, American Peoples Encyclopedia, where the argument is made that since both environment and heredity entered into achievement, or into actual social or economic status, selection on the basis of this final status outcome would produce no improvement in the genetic level. The answer is that the efficiency of selection when heredity and environment are about equally contributory is reduced not abolished. So long as hereditary and environmental gifts are uncorrelated it is still sound and effective to select for genetic effect by operating with final, mixed "performance criterion." If they are positively correlated (and negative correlation is rare) on the other hand (and this has been shown to be true in the important case of intelligence and education), adjusting birth rate to actual final achievement constitutes very powerful eugenic selection of intelligence as such.
Technical complications reside also in the fact that with certain patterns of genetic origin of traits, selection would be rapid and with others only limited in action, as in a model which Penrose (1948) points out. It seems to be the hobby of anti-eugenists to concoct fancy models of the latter kind to disprove eugenic possibilities, though as Poniatoff shows (in the case just cited), they may lead to scientifically quite absurd results.
 As recently as 1918 some governments thought that they could make money by printing it. As Friedman (1968) points out, the heavy printing of new style money by the Bolsheviks at a time when a fixed amount of old style (Czarist) money was in circulation caused the former to lose value by inflation and the latter to climb in its rate of exchange.
 It has taken most of a century for a real appreciation of the moral implications of reproductive behavior to be properly appreciated, and most of this advance in sensitivity has been due to the writings of the comparatively small group of scientists who have developed eugenics. For the reader who wishes to get a more thorough grasp of the concepts that have developed in the technical and socially far-sighted literature in this area, a relatively long, yet still too brief note is offered here covering the movement of eugenic ideas.
Although explicit eugenics is less than a century old, the basic propositions appearing in various original thinkers, go back to classical and biblical times. Beginning (as far as records go) with Plato (in The Republic) and continuing with a recent crescendo in some far-sighted biologists and social scientists such as Charles Darwin, Galton, Leonard Darwin, J. Huxley (1957), Hardin (1964), Graham (1970), Keith (1949) and Muller (1953), the main argument (at least for "preventive or negative eugenics") has been well summed up by Dobzhansky (1960): "If we allow the weak and deformed to propagate their kind, we face the prospect of a genetic twilight; but if we let them die or suffer, we face the certainty of a moral twilight." Selection by birth rate instead of death rate is thus the key proposition in eugenics.
Most practical propositions have concentrated more on an economic direction of planned parenthood — rightly as the present writer believes — rather than on sterilization, eutelegenesis, chromosomal engineering, postponement of marriage, and other measures relevant only to small groups, or, too socially radical in nature to be accepted for sometime. As stated in the text, the correlation of income with health, intelligence and responsibility of character is probably positive through 90% of the population, and breaks down only in the very rich and very poor. Consequently fitting birth rate to earnings would ensure a generally positive eugenic trend. In the name of perspective on this, the central fact to keep in mind is that from the abject poverty level to a comfortable living condition the great majority are striving for a common goal of economic adequacy, so that their success tends to correlate with their competence.
The effectiveness of trying to operate simply through an economically-assisted and public-opinion-encouraged differential birth rate, maintained through the bulk of normal families, has, it is true, repeatedly been criticized and doubted (in favor of more spectacular methods) even by some leading thinkers. Thus H. J. Muller (1966) argues "Most genetically less fit individuals would not accept the judgment of their being so themselves, and [would then not] voluntarily engage in less than the average reproduction. Nor, vice versa, would the more fit choose to make the career sacrifices ... by their having larger families." He concedes "this could be taken care of ... by taxes ... but in a democracy the enforcement of such seeming discrimination would hardly be accepted." Many may think this pessimism to be realistic political psychology. Perhaps it was at the time he wrote but it does not allow for increasing biological education, and, above all, for the newer moral standards that Beyondism can develop.
A supplementary argument for raising the economic level of the submerged tenth, even by outright charity, comes to us in the initial indication (still needing to be checked) that any rise in income produces a reduction in family size. The argument is that this works because there is now a standard of living to be threatened by excessive multiplication. From this, one may conclude that the "amour propre" of the sub-normal will work in favor of reduction, not as Muller supposed. At the other end of society, as regards the willingness of above average income families to have more children, fitness is here self-defining. Those with insufficient superego development to accept the sacrifices are self-eliminating. Lastly, in doubt of Muller's social judgment above, one must add that he is repeating what seems a fallacious interpretation of the main dynamics of democracy. (Unfortunately, it is partly true that envy and jealousy can make democracy a leveling-down operation. But Christianity, Humanism and Beyondism unite in one common moral persuasion here to accept individual differences with appreciation and admiration rather than envy.)
How large an effect eugenics can exert by a positive socio-economic birth rate remains to be evaluated. Meanwhile, at least history tells us that a negative eugenic situation can produce notable deterioration in perhaps six to twelve generations, as, for example, in Rome from 150 to 350 A.D. However, probably never in history has there been a period in which dysgenic trends could take effect so rapidly as in the modern welfare state — if morale should fail in the larger, unendowed respectable skilled worker and lower middle class section. Three or four generations of disregard for genetic quality through the middle range of society might lead to such a breakdown of society under "welfare" conditions as would be irremediable.
The view that the number of children a family produces is no one else's concern has to go. There is no "God given right to propagate" without an equally "God given right" to starve or to be massacred in world wars. Most economists in political advisory positions are at present doing exactly nothing about the fact that university graduate students subsist on grants which forbid them to have a family until an age which effectively reduces their eugenic contribution to the next generation, whereas welfare state paupers, individuals of few skills, and those unadjusted to steady work can reproduce and have their legitimate and illegitimate offspring taken off their hands.
The New York Times, in a recent leader, probably accurately describing the associated misery and vice in the submerged tenth, notes that 33% of the relief "families" surveyed are deserted by the father. It continues, with the journalist's prerogative, to criticize this as an indictment of an America falling short of its ideals." Actually, sentimental "ideals" (notably unreadiness to face biological and economic facts) — such as the above unrestricted "right to propagate" — are the main cause of the persistence of this problem for so many generations.
 Apart from these serious considerations, it is not entirely trivial to add that the collection of a "single value" tax (over the range of, say, the economically middle 80% of the community) would eliminate such an enormous amount of accounting and inspection time that the benefit to the welfare of the community would be immense. However, if a differential tax is to be maintained in this middle range, the social scientist may, at least, point out that a highly necessary income tax reform is a far larger child allowance and/or college scholarship allowance for able and stable children regardless of income of the parent. (The present practice in many scholarship schemes of denying the earned scholarship of a child whose parents have a middling income and admitting a definitely less bright candidate whose parents have earned less is highly dysgenic.) At present, the cost to the parent who begets an able child suited for and ultimately receiving a university education is far greater (perhaps $15,000 per child) than the production of a less gifted child, whose education may end at eighteen. Economic laws as at present permitted to act thus operate to reduce the production of the bright.
Incidentally, though liberal opinion has hitherto favored scholarships over income tax remission, on the logic that heredity is imperfect (though the correlation of mid-parent with mid-child on intelligence is about 0.7), some counter arguments have been overlooked. (1) The "reward" of a scholarship comes twenty years after the decision to conceive a child, which is a little remote to be effective, even with far-sighted parents, whereas tax remission would take effect at birth of the child. (2) In spite of the fact that all psychological investigation shows about education (especially of character) in the home being decidedly more potent than in school, many educators persist in believing that progress in education is entirely a school affair. But economic encouragement which results in more children being brought up in homes with richer cultural background should certainly be introduced. A larger income tax allowance for children would be such a measure. (3) Finally, a punitive income tax interferes with the process of charitable endowment and support being discriminatingly directed to the values and institutions which individuals themselves perceive as being the source of their success. For example, a man who has succeeded through overcoming alcoholism may direct his modicum of savings to a society to save alcoholics. There is a sense in which this is an empirical and scientific (if still partially blind) direction of saved income to the most appropriate activities for the improvement of society. It is surely more real than the action of a civil service department directing the disposal of taxes collected by a government — swayed either by doctrinaire theory or a "pork barrel" vote.
 In as much as the pleasure principle can strongly express itself in individual buying, e.g., by favoring luxuries rather than necessities, and ignoring long term realities (such as the necessity to save), there can surely be little doubt, however, that capitalism needs to move in the direction of more control by sales, by excise taxes and by manipulation of borrowing rates, to tax relatively degenerate forms of expenditure. This is recognized, for example, in respect to tobacco, drugs, alcohol, gambling, etc. But, it needs to be recognized still more when more is spent on, say, breeding race horses and running race tracks or on pornographic literature than on scientific research or up-to-date libraries. Here the real issue becomes one of the degree to which the cultural and political leaders of a country can and should dictate the growth of good, as opposed to decadent and degenerate recreations and expenditures (in terms, of course, of the moral values which that society has chosen).
As to the difficult issue concerning the relative extent of the economic control of expenditures and endowments by government and by private individuals, what may be seen as an inconsistency between the above position on the role of private savings (page 326 above) and the present position on taxation of expenditure is not really so. The above position argued that individuals who save should be free to endow what seems to them valuable social service. The present position is that the government should be free to tax relatively heavily expenditures that are frivolous, unhealthy, extravagantly luxurious or degenerate. The anti-establishment fraction of the recent permissive generation will argue that no one knows what is degenerate taste or bad morals. The Beyondist contention is that though this is true of what is derived from intuitive, revealed religious values, social scientific research will soon be capable of more objectively evaluating the relative progressiveness or decadence of expenditures.
 As mentioned earlier, the argument was explicitly put by Max Weber that certain religious moral values could also be conductive to the economic success and stability of a community; and he argued specifically that the Protestant ethic of industry, enterprise, and frugality aided this goal. (However, several other ethical cultural values do the same: the industry and frugality of the Chinese, and the values of the Judaic religion, have produced a similar economic differential from their neighbors.) Beyondism would endorse this evolutionary value of a larger population based on wiser economics arguing that inter-group economic competition is one of the most effective and humane methods of engineering expansion and contraction.
An empirical study among sixty-nine countries (Cattell, 1949) does, indeed, show a factor besides that of education-affluence (already discussed, see table 4.2) which links average real income to such variables as are shown in Table 8.1. Although the influence which is responsible for the vigor of environmental control expressed in this pattern is not yet clear, there is no doubt about the existence of some independent underlying factor of this pattern in the economic domain.
One may have here a plexus of religious preference, temperament, enterprise, and industry. Incidentally, it has a negative correlation (-0.43) with percentage of population Buddhist. The pattern is offered here as the merest first glimpse of an interesting directing of further research on the contributors and consequences associated with economic level. But, it does offer some support for both Weber's and McDougall's reasonings in this area.
If a fuller array of experimental variables could be introduced (these studies are costly), one suspects that a restrictive attitude to sexual expression, a reluctance to spend on luxuries and to waste time, and other adjustments calculated to direct energy into control of environment and scientific exploration would be found in this pattern. For the present, all that one can note here is that apparently, with equal natural resources and natural gifts, certain value systems inimical to dissipation of emotional energy will alter the whole level of economic production. This observation brings together the considerations in the first part of this section on the inter-individual morality value of economic practices, with their final testing out taking place in the inter-group situation.
Table 8.1 "Achievement": An Economic Level Value Dimension in Modern Nations
High real income per head. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.68
High protein consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.47
High percentage of Protestant affiliation. . . . 0.46
Low homicide rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-0.45
Many miles of railroad
(and other applied science variables) per person 0.41
High percentage of Nordic population*. . . . . . 0.37
Low frequency of revolutions . . . . . . . . . .-0.35
Low (controlled) birth rate. . . . . . . . . . .-0.34