In history up to the present the primary survival-determining groups have been first, family — in the primitive, wandering, hunting and food gathering which held for hundreds of thousands of years; then the tribal and larger family; and then city-state and nation. The last — for Egyptians, the descendants of Sumerians and a few other peoples — has now been going on for five thousand years. Since at least medieval times we may take the nation as the primary group to which in practice we refer.
Christ — and other religious leaders — have bid the individual give up family and other groups for the sake of the religious group and such overt competing and bidding among groups for interest and loyalty is common. A central theme in the drama of Western history has been the battle for human allegiance between the "sovereign" nations and the universalist religious groups — Christianity and Mohammedanism. Most possibilities of sociologically interesting variants have been realized at one time or another — Japanese Shintoism where nation and religion are joined; Hebrewism where the unique is claimed to be the universal; the Holy Roman Empire and the Communist block, where (if Communism may be generically considered a religion) nationalisms are like eggs in the basket of a common religion — and so on. But virtually all are now variants on the main theme of (a) nations, and (b) universalist religious congregations.
 That conjunction was of (a) a stage in the early spread of universal and free education in which there were unusually gross disparities in class educational values; (b) a phase in industrialization which had produced enormous economic disparities; (c) a greater awareness in a half-educated and untravelled working class of the between class, than the between nation differences of values; (d) an anarchic breakdown of loyalty to the nation in the extreme stress of war and defeat. The "class war" was a brief episode, which has now reverted to the stronger polarization, as Communist Russia opposes Communist China.
 A well-known instance of an explicit assumption that inter-group rules ought to be a simple copy of inter-individual rules is in the speech by Woodrow Wilson which triggered the entry of the U.S.A. into World War I. "We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states...." (Congressional Record for April 2, 1917.)
 Perhaps by taking too close and concrete an example at an early stage of the argument we run a risk of confusing basic principles with local values. Nevertheless, the above instance of "foreign aid," as practiced by many countries besides the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., is worth an illustrative pause. When countries flounder in poverty because they take no decisive steps to control their birth rates does it help to send famine relief, or does it not rather, as most neo-Malthusians have concluded (see Hardin, 1964), merely reward and make still more resistant to change the cultural habits which systematically produce famine? In short, relieving famine, in some cultures, increases the likelihood of greater famine. Or, in more subtle fields, let us ask what happens to cultural evolution when countries which accept all kinds of benefits of organized science, developed at the research cost of other countries, fail to alter their values one iota from supersition toward science or to make the least contribution to mankind's need for scientific knowledge? When we simply give, with no strings attached, to corrupt communities, devoid of a sense of social duty, do we aid movement toward civic responsibility or help develop in the individual the habit of a well-organized daily life? More likely he is encouraged to persist "all along of dirtiness, all along of mess, all along of doing things rather more or less" in a spirit of cheerful irresponsibility.
A much respected world commentator on international and interracial dealings, Gunnar Myrdal (1968), renowned (or suspected) for the liberality of his viewpoints, has recently confessed that he sees the causes of Asian poverty and other Asian endemic problems in something far more culturally pervasive than he first thought could be cured by legislation and loans of technical task forces. From a wide sampling of observations he believes the roots of underdevelopment lie in: "Low levels of work discipline, punctuality and orderliness; superstitious beliefs and irrational outlooks; lack of alertness, adaptability, ambition, and general readiness for change and experiment; submissiveness to authority and exploitation; low aptitude for cooperation" and so on. (Let it be noted that these conclusions are well in accord with psychological experiments which, though still on too small a sampling, consistently show in the populations of certain countries (Cattell and Scheier, 1961; Lynn, 1971) higher scores on personality traits of a neurotic (unrealistic, unstable, emotional) kind, such as have been shown in small experimental groups (Cattell and Stice, 1969) seriously to damage most kinds of group performance.) Whatever, the correct quantitative statement may be about the relative standing of particular cultures in these respects (and America with its hippies and Britain with a few incorrigibly featherbedding trade unions are not spotless of permitting cultural sabotage in the interests of emotional-self-indulgence), it is obvious that some countries vary enormously along some of the dimensions we looked at in chapter 4. The technical decision may to some seem premature, but the writer considers that we can say with substantial probability that the status of any country on certain of these cultural dimensions will have predictive value for ultimate survival.
 Shifts in people alone do not guarantee shifts in culture. Instances of invasion with seemingly no lasting cultural effects are numerous. The invasions of Egypt by "barbarians" for a time seemed to leave the culture unaltered; the flooding by the hordes of Ghengis Khan, just cited, seems to have led to the Tartars leaving remarkably little cultural or even much racial residue in the area dominated, and much nearer home one may cite the case of the English in Ireland. On the other hand, as with the Russians in Czechoslovakia, the Americans in the Phillipines, Japan in Korea, or the Romans in Gaul, Spain and Britain, the cultural effects are not to be underestimated.
By contrast, those expansions which have been accompanied by substantial supplanting of the native peoples, as in the migration of the classical Greeks into Greece, of the English into England, of the Americans into the Indian lands of North America, of the Japanese into Hokkaido, and of the English into New Zealand and Australia, have shown quite permanent cultural and (as far as available measures go) genetic gains (and the incursion of the Israelites into Arab territory may show the same). A generalization of this kind, if sustained with more detailed correlations (such as Darlington (1969) begins to supply), is an argument for the effectiveness of joint racial and cultural transplantation, such as occurs in what we are designating "expansion." It may rest in part on the argument above that there is some inherently greater viability of a particular culture when developed in a particular, congenial racial group, whence culture and race survive better when transplanted together.
 As indicated in the last chapter we properly use the word "racial" for a distinctive genetic complex — a pattern — of gene endowment — embodied in a population. Yet the future is actually likely to be little concerned with the haphazard, existing races. Far more important in the future will be the races yet to be formed in the crucibles of culture and scientific design. The formation of existing races and peoples (conglomerates of races) has rested, as far as the half dozen primary races are concerned, (Coon, 1962a; Hooton, 1946) on independent mutations occuring in some degree of climatic and geographical isolation of the group. Within-group selection and genetic drift, and other forces then operated to produce distinctive groups (Dobzhansky, 1960; Keith, 1949) as now studied with mathematical sensitivity by the geneticist. These seem to have accounted for the three or four major and many more minor races now recognized by physical anthropologists. The monumental work of Coon (1962a,b) and others presents the fascinating story of this creation of races over the last fifty thousand years. Deliberate cultural selection and the engineering of the molecular geneticist rather than the climate or the physical environment are likely now to become predominant. That is to say, the demands of the particular cultural environment that has been distinctively created by each group and the isolation of an interbreeding set of people within the culture is likely rapidly (in terms of archeological time) to mold as many new biological sub-races as there are cultures. Furthermore, we must not forget that, as suggested above, a people will consciously conceive and attempt to engineer its own genetic destiny in some independence from the cultural molding.
Thus modern nations and language groups — the genetic make-up each of which usually consists originally of a "people" — i.e., a hybridized mixture of the older races rather than any new race — are in process through their action as inbreeding pools, of creating new races. Let us leave to the physical anthropologist and population geneticist the question of how many generations may be needed for these re-structurings of the old races to produce the statistically recognizable homogeneity of new "cultural races." The world traveller can already glimpse some partly culturally produced races, especially where marriages within a culture have been long continued, as say, in the Jewish religion, the Scandinavian language group, or the Japanese nation. The triumphs of cultural advance are obvious; those of genetic advance are more abstracted from the surface behavior and likely to be evident only to the precise and analytical methods of the scientist. And in pace they march with the slow, deliberate tread of centuries. This is perceived also by the deeply probing poet, as by Thomas Hardy in The Dynasts (1904) where he speaks of that which can:
In curve and voice and eye
Despise the human span
That is I.
In evaluating mutual induction effects by culture and race, one of the main problems with which the social scientists of the future will have to work concerns the decidedly slower responsiveness of race to historical influences.
(Though, for that matter, culture also has more gyroscopic momentum from generation to generation than the molding school teacher likes to believe.) Thus what Communism molds in Russian culture may yet prove to be superficial compared to deeper attitudes which it does not touch. In culture pattern statistics comparing Czarist to Communist periods it is surprising that the bulk of the factors show considerable persistence. Probably genetic make-up has a still more persistent and steadying (or retarding according to viewpoint) flywheel influence on the cultural experiments that are embedded in it. In this connection behavioral geneticists have still to ask such questions as "How far does cultural borrowing among groups tend to restrict the natural and desirable divergence that would otherwise occur among the genetic types of different groups?"
 The type of mentality which for lack of a new term we still call "liberal" (and which is common, for example, among younger students and the literati), though it lacks the independence and realism of thought of the nineteenth century liberal, is often prepared to be highly inconsistent on the subject of pugnacity. A person of this type cheerfully condones violence in the anti-social individual while being allergic to disciplined force in the group. He is captive to superstitious stereotypes about force, while claiming to be emncipated from any "stereotypes" on sex. Regardless of whether his "rationality" about free sex expression is as logical as he believes, the fact remains that no early Victorian experienced greater difficulty in looking sex in the eye than this type of literati experiences in trying to look objectively at natural assertiveness. To judge by modern journalistic emphases, the great preoccupation today is in controlling "aggressive" impulses as it was sexual impulses to the Victorian. It is true (see Chapter 6) that experimental personality study shows the sexual and pugnacious ergs as most involved in suppression and the growth of cultural pressure, Table 4.3, suggests that the latter would become more salient in this generation. However, there is a difference between recognizing these facts and entering upon the panic-stricken repression processes which make intellectual acceptance of "imperialism" as a normal need (sometimes inappropriate or perverted) as difficult as Victorians found the acceptance of sex (sometimes inappropriate or perverted) as a normal need. This is not a condonement of war: it is a recognition that by treating expansive forces realistically and without immediate condemnation we could often avoid war.
As to political hypocrisy over the term "imperialism" let us note that Russia, for example, during the period in which it spoke most scathingly against American and British Imperialism, took over Lithuania, Latvia, part of Finland, part of Poland, Western Mongolia, and several other areas. Britain, in the same period, adjustive to realities of political power, and without conflict, withdrew its political control from countless thousands of square miles and millions of native peoples scattered about the earth. Germany contracted; Japan enormously expanded and then contracted. Poland (to spell such changes, for one example, more specifically) lost through World War II a noticeable percentage of its area, 22% of its people and 40% of its national wealth, and suffered the migration elsewhere of Lithuanian, Ukranian and German minorities.
All these changes of people and political area occurred in the middle of a century which likes to assert that expansion and contraction of frontiers are gone for good.
The fact is surely that successful expansion, as the case of the Chinese into early Japan, the English into North America and the Spanish into South America, is more often than not accompanied by qualities which by any historical test, represent superior culturo-racial capacities. The sterile expansion of a Ghengis Khan type is an exception, and is likely to become still more exceptional as military action is increasingly eliminated from international adjustments and military capacity itself becomes more closely tied to educational and technical levels of the cultures concerned.
 Indulgences may be too specific a term for the often merely "irrelevant" or superfluous expenditures — irrelevant to any group goal or cultural stimulation — which are prone to occur in a society with a rising living standard. The "dissipations" which have weakened societies have by no means been patently luxuries and perversions. They have ranged from accumulating what can only be called "cultural bric-a-brac," through somewhat excessive comforts and sensuous modes of self-expression to another area where the activities can superficially be called Humanitarian or intellectual in character. In forms ranging from beatnik festivals to self-acclaimed avante garde
art, our society at the moment is obviously heading into such a climate. Parenthetically, the chief bastion against the flood of sybaritism in phases of plenty has been, in Western cultures so far, in what since Max Weber's time has been briefly designated "the Protestant ethic" (without prejudice to Catholicism also having strict encyclicals on the subject of waste.) The Protestant ethic as so defined by Weber and others is essentially an ascetic assertion that good works and simplicity of living should prevail. As such this would lead to excess wealth being converted into a larger population operating at acceptable living standards and higher educational levels. This is one more instance of a Beyondist derivation leading to the same values as a "revealed" ethic — in this case the revealed ethic of Quaker Christianity.
Of these puritan bearers of the new ethic Weber says: "Over against the glitter and ostentation of feudal magnificence which, resting on unsound economic basis, prefers a sordid elegance to a sober simplicity, they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle class home as an ideal" (Weber, page 171, 1904). Defining it in more specific goals, he says: "To be avoided are (1) Worldly vanity; thus all ostentation, frivolity, and use of things having no practical purpose... (2) Any unconscientious use of wealth, such as excessive expenditure for not very urgent needs, above providing for the real needs of life and the future." (Paraphrased from R. Bavelay, Apology for the True Christian Divinity
, London, 1701, 4th Edition.)
 A recent popular article asks "How long can Western culture go on being an island of plenty in a sea of misery?" It is one of many rhetorical appeals in perhaps half of which the suggestion is that if a country reaches and maintains a good living standard the envious have-nots will gang up and destroy it. The other half of the apologists does not threaten, but takes the alternative attack that Western culture should feel very guilty about its relative social success. In either case the "solution by charity" so long as many Asian countries maintain their fantastic birth rate, corruption, and the habits Myrdal has so well described (page 226), would be as rational as trying to dry up this "sea of misery" by throwing some lone island piece by piece into the ocean. Japan, one may note, once looked as if it were part of that sea, but is now likely to become the world's most prosperous nation. The control of population in Japan began not as a result of charity, nor through acceptance of propaganda for Christian values (which it rejected), but as a sequel to defeat in World War II. There is no evidence that even if charity is used as a means of teaching it is any more effective — or even as effective — as a realistic and perhaps punishing challenge from environment.
Actually the real extent of charitable aid among nations is far less than the man in the street might imagine from popular discussion about the aid programs of his own nation. It extends from two or three down to less than one percent of the national product in the "giving" nations, and is, of course, zero over most of the world's countries. However, this same amount if bequeathed to social scientific and medical research would seem an enormous gift. The unfortunate deception in calling it charity rather than an investment in propaganda or political influence is its worst aspect. A typical newspaper editorial, when the U.S. responded to Russian infiltration through aid, by raising its own, ran as follows: "President X is a believer in foreign aid. He accepts the proposition that developed nations should give aid to underdeveloped ones — that rich nations should help poor nations." Thus are illusions fostered and maintained. No more complete instance of the fallacious confusion of what morality indicates for inter-individual and inter-group morality could be found however, than in the following, apparently sincere argument by a senator:
"The obligation of the rich to help the poor is recognized, as far as I know, by every major religion, by every formal system of ethics, and by individuals who claim no moral code beyond a simple sense of human decency. Unless national borders are regarded as the limits of human loyalty and compassion as well as of political authority, the obligation of the rich to the poor clearly encompasses an obligation on the part of rich nations to poor nations. Indeed, it is no more than common sense to recognize that, among nations as within them, the security of the rich is best assured by proving hope and opportunity for the poor
"Neither we nor any other nation, however, have yet accepted an obligation to the poor nations in any way analogous to that which we accept toward the individual poor and the poorer states and regions within our own country." (Fulbright, 1967). I have italicized the sentence in which truth breaks through rhetoric.
However, the U.S.A. is at present giving $100,000,000 aid a year to Egypt; the manners and morals in which are very different from our own (Cattell, Breul and Hartmann, 1952). In the context of within-group "charity" such gifts would, of course, be a legitimate part of support of within-group common function. In between-group dealings, short of saving life in mortal peril, these "gifts" have other functions. It is unfortunately part of the common assumption among politicians that rhetoric requires cant which causes them to speak of this as "charity" instead of honestly defining it.
 Among these cobwebby delusions that a quick broom must necessarily remove, are the still repeated cliches that wars are due to armament manufacturers, capitalists, world Jewry, professional military men, patriotic citizens, and so on through a list of scapegoats. Not far removed from this is the idea that journalistic "incitement" has much to do with war, but this mental excitement is trivial compared to the fundamental frustrations that might be operative. What can one say when the supposed work of mature thinkers, in Article 26 of the UN Declaration of Rights, proposes penalties for "the advocacy of hatred and hostility between men"? With the characteristic superficial, indeed, journalistic, omission of regard for fundamentals which has unfortunately characterized the early place seekers in UNESCO, this condemns Christ's hostility to the pharisees and the money changers in the temple. It ignores the psychological reality that the height of a hatred simply reflects the profundity of a prior love. For instance, no "hatred and hostility" equals that of the unselfish love of a mother when frustrated by a threat to the life of her child. In 1953 the US Government declined, with admirable perception of cant, to sign the above clause. And it has declined again in June 1970, to sign the so-called genocide Convention, which actually appears merely designed for general international interference. To eliminate war we do not have to contemplate the elimination of life, i.e., of love-hatred or the diversification of living communities.
Yet another form of tragic misdirection of the young or immature is the presentation to them of the proposition that world peace is immediately achievable by a simple decision. (See
Congressional Record Speeches, e.g., April 28, 1970, or most any issue of political speeches here and abroad.) No social psychologist would be ready to predict that a social habit definitely known to be 5000 years old and in less organized form two million years, is going to be dropped by all in a decade. Purely technical innovations, such as the eradication of smallpox, can be achieved in a generation. But these depend on the disciplined intellects of trained and coordinated scientists, whereas pressures for war come from the gut of the man in the street and from the ballot box. A Norwegian statistician has shown that in 5560 years of history surveyed there have been 14,551 distinct wars (2.6 per year). Let us bring into conjunction with these figures the fact that just since 1900 AD, 1,700,000 people have been pointlessly killed in traffic accidents, more than all the military personnel killed in every major war from the American Revolution to Vietnam (Congressional Record, 91st Congress, W. L. Springer, August 10, 1970). We are unlikely to control the former more complex problem if we cannot control within our own borders the latter, simpler but actually more deadly problem. The most optimistic estimate possible, supposing as much advance achieved in social science in this century as took place in medical science in the last century, is that the disease of war may take at least as long to bring under control as multiple sclerosis, arthritis, cancer or schizophrenia.
 Christianity, taken as an example of a universal religion which advocates nonaggression in inter-individual behavior, has never in its officially responsible writings claimed that wars are indefensible in inter-group behavior, though masses of people seem to have assumed that it has. Historically, in the Crusades, recently in opposing Nazism and Communism, and in countless other instances the highest theological opinion interpreting Christianity — Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox — has in fact made it clear that conscientious objection to war is not an integral part of Christian belief. "I came not to bring peace but a sword" is considered meant by Christ also to define the Christian's duty to sacrifice his life in battle against earthly powers of evil, as well as in the original abstract sense of spiritual strife. In Mohammedanism the positive duty of war was still more clear in the great Mohammedan expansion. Paradoxically, as some would think, the verdict of history is that Christian nations have been the most active and successful in war of any. Their formidableness is surely partly due to the excellence of the internal morale, as contributed by religion. Conscientious objection still needs a base in some nonsubjective ethical system.
However, the present argument rests on the fact that the principle of "turning the other cheek" where groups are concerned, vanishes as a cultural value along with the culture which espouses it.
 In 555 BC Sparta and Argos sought to settle a war by combat of 300 champions a side. One Spartan and two Argives were left alive. Dissatisfaction led to a real war in which the Spartans were decisively victorious.
 It should be noted that no role or credence whatever has been credited here to the supposed psychological need for war as an expression of innate "aggression." (See
Carthy and Ebling, 1964.) The self-assertive drive which is undoubtedly one of the human ergs, does not include pugnacity, as the bastard concept "aggressive" traps many into believing. As pointed out earlier the pugnacity erg, which is distinct from self-assertion (need for eminence and mastery of environment) draws its energy with equal facility from thwarted hunger, love or curiosity, as from frustrated self-assertion. Consequently, the only sense in which human nature has a "need for war" lies in the effect of the complex frustrations of a complicated culture. Reversion to hitting people on the head may by a momentary relief, and in this sense we can speak of a "need for war," but it is not a specific "need of aggression" but derives from the situational frustration of any and all life ergs.
The position taken here is thus precisely the opposite to that taken by Russell above (page 199), when he views a "preventive war" as being not too great a price to pay for the cessation of the Cold War and the cost of armaments. It is precisely by such emotional intolerance of the tax of ongoing competition that nations rush into war. It is a specious as well as a tempting short cut, for it invariably leads to a new, post-war "cold war." Happy acceptance of a healthy and continuous inter-group competition by all concerned is probably the most important prerequisite for avoiding war.
 Great though the temptation may be to "civilize" all rules of inter-group competition, more extended examination of the proposition is likely to show that this can be done in no simple "Sunday School" fashion. Civilizing steps may almost certainly safely begin with the outlawing of war, and the control of unfair competitive practices. But should they proceed to restrictions on certain forms of competition that seem, to many, inconvenient or disturbing? Such good intentions could nevertheless be the beginning of the end of man as an evolving creature. A stagnation of this kind is more likely to happen, of course, through the action of some world organization which has failed from the beginning to espouse Beyondist ethics (and which like UNO tolerates too many false assumptions, as in the absurdity of one vote for one country regardless of its size or culturo-political standing!). But it is a possible
degenerative disease even with a world federation which aims to be Beyondist in conception from the beginning.
It is this possibility which brings us face to face with the difficult question explicitly raised but not fully answered earlier, namely: "Must the forms of competition be free to take any
shape, however severe or rigorous ("cruel"), or can the same quality of natural selection be achieved less wastefully and painfully by artificially "domesticating" this "game" of competition, by rules that a world council could devise?" The most constantly recurring demand here, as far as outlawing some one form of competition is concerned, is unquestionably for rejecting all resort to war. The above beginning of an objective examination may suggest that at the moment a clear answer cannot be given. Here one may hope that no intelligent reader has made the mistake of misperceiving our respect for realism in seeking the truest expression of Beyondist principles, as any mere harshness or callousness. The aim of organizing social science for human betterment is expressly the humane one of finding radically less wasteful and cruel, but still effective
measures. A typical instance is the Beyondist's emphasis on eugenic measures, which can give us continuing natural selection without all the individual suffering of allowing the congenitally potentially diseased to be brought into the world to die or can allow the phasing out of a culture without its destruction by war. However, in all such "once removed" steps (as we may call them, to prevent our forgetting their relation to real, immediate demands), human judgment may go wrong. Fortunately, inter-group selection always has the "fail-safe" device that in the end we are recalled to the judgment of nature.
Thus the first move is to inaugurate birth control instead of famine; economic competition instead of genocide; a social science calculation instead of a war, and so on. But in such moves one must distinguish, on the one hand, between genuine humane substitutes for the harsher forms of natural selection, effectively operating at one remove, and, on the other, purely artificial, non-functional substitutes that are humane but useless. "Idealists" must be reminded that decision between nations by the Olympic Games is no functional substitute for the verdict of more "total" forms of competition. Although the battle of Waterloo may in a sense have been "won upon the playing fields of Eton," the full economic resources, manufacturing skill, international diplomacy, popular morale, and military skills of Britain and France at that time could never have been contained or evaluated in a game beside the Eton wall. Countless reasonably efficient substitutions (as, among individuals, of a classroom examination for a demonstrated professional life performance) can function tolerably for a long time. But these convenient predictors always fall short of full predictive validity. When real doubts accumulate there can be no final substitution of a game with rules for competition unbounded by rules
. Whether the freedom implied here for groups to break into entirely new domains of competition is likely to be understood and condoned by a too staid world organization remains to be seen. Maybe history will have to await periods of temporary breakdown of federated control and overthrow of the world organization in order to change the rules and scope of action from time to time.
In short, the creation of a substitute for something with such diverse and complex functions as war is not easy. Certainly it will not be effected by any doctrinaire "bureaucratic" decision, of the type now offered by UNO, in which maintaining the status quo
is the sole consideration and which is remote from the realities of organic group life. In the growth of empire, watching the inadequacy of the bureaucratic pedant, Kipling (1940) asked:
Ah! What avails the classic bent
And what the cultured word.
Against the undoctored incident
That actually occurred!
Douglas MacArthur (1964) said it again with equally admirable terseness: "In war there is no substitute for victory." (Or, to transpose MacArthur's values into science, no scholarly dissertation can be a substitute for discovery.) So, in whatever adjustive procedures we substitute for war, it must be an evolutionary realism, not a set of doctrinaire statements about equality or ancestral rights, that prevails.
 We have questioned, at several points earlier, the common assumption that a group which is more indulgent, protective, compassionate, "humane" and protective to its members receives better service from them in all respects. At least, we have argued that a sceptical examination should be made of the proposition that a justification can be made for an unbounded degree of group cosseting of individuals on the grounds of such a functional effect. However, psychological research yet to be done may
prove that certain kinds of single-minded devotion to creativity, research and community service appear more frequently where the members of the group are indeed shielded to a high degree from the gross demands of war, crime, exploitation, and harsher economic conditions. Correspondingly, in the functioning of the individual, clearer thoughts may appear, as to Archimedes, in the relaxation and seclusion of a comfortable bath.
The issue of creativity and protection is no trivial one. But as far as the "comfort" of the arts is concerned, the alternative should be considered that their good effect comes from a contribution to emotional integration rather than mere consolation. To take a familiar culture for the sake of illustration, it could be asserted that the literature of England has done more for the "morale," enjoyment and integration of its mode of life than the literature of some other countries of lesser creativity has done for them. From Shakespeare's "precious stone set in a silver sea" and "happy breed of men" through Kipling's (1940):
Trackway and Camp and City lost;
Salt march where now is corn;
Old Wars, old Peace, old Arts that cease;
And so was England born!
and so to Brooke's (1943):
Her sights and sounds; dreams happy as her day;
And laughter, learnt of friends; and gentleness,
In hearts at peace, under an English heaven.
all tell of a culture fortunate in having resolved many of the inconsistencies which wrack other cultures. And that integration and perception was apparently achieved by "humanistic" culture. It built, however, upon a general culture of sound "material" and political foundations (which latter are seen incidentally, by dialectical materialists, as the whole
story). The contribution to group survival of the spiritual discoveries in the national culture, when hurricanes strike is surely as great, as the history of this and other countries may show, as that from grosser material factors. And in extreme cases, as that of Israel, the possession of a spiritual, written culture, may even be able to reconstitute a nation whose physical existence and political structure have been completely scattered by the tornadoes of history.
 A psychological study of the mechanisms and the fate of various types of culture borrowings is greatly needed. One suspects that decidedly less than half of the transplants are successful and of those that are viable, another half may turn out in the end to be definitely noxious. It is instructive to think of the main importation — other than venereal disease — of Elizabethan culture from the Carribean Indians — tobacco smoking! (Though further afield, it is true that the voyagers found the potato.) Borrowing by the criterion of present prestige may also turn out to be ill-timed. Doubtless there were cities that borrowed more from effette and luxurious Egypt in 1000 B.C. than from the far more promising but rough early Greeks. Because of political and military interaction, Britain has borrowed more from France than Nordic Europe since early times and certainly since 1900. One's doubts would concern mainly the probability that much has been missed by this preoccupation with one direction of borrowing and the conservative influence of keeping to a classical, Humanistic, conservative Mediterranean emphasis in education rather than opening up to the more modern scientific and socially exploratory movements of Germany, Sweden, America, and lately, Russia. (To take a small but revealing concrete instance, Britain hesitates almost neurotically between accepting practicing psychologists as constituting a new profession, as in America or Holland, and proceeding conservatively to recognize only the medically qualified "psychologist" as in Italy, Spain, and most of France, accepting clinical psychology as only a branch of the ancient medical profession.) Furthermore, in this overview, let us recognize again that the borrowing of "good" elements can sometimes be as destructive as bad, if they are from so remote a culture as to be indigestible in the functional pattern. For example, the Japanese influence in the East Indies, in the form of modern medicine, created a problem by cutting down the death rate but not the birth rate.
 It must not be overlooked that the triumphs of intellectual culture are achieved at environmental and genetic costs. As to the former, it could be argued that if Germany has deflected more talent from science to politics in the nineteenth century it would not have entered the twentieth century with alliances defective relative to those of the diplomatically more experienced Britain and France. Since restriction of the birth rate is characteristic of the talented (geniuses as parents, seem never even to replace
their numbers), and of the educated middle class, the education contributions of, say, France, may be said to have been achieved by a genetic expenditure. And today the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. are contributing (by taxation or its equivalent) five to ten times more per head of population to scientific and medical research for the world at large than most other countries.
Incidentally, the fact that some scientists themselves tend to ignore the need for or to protest against (Oppenheimer, 1955) any national restriction of discoveries should by no means be considered evident of nobility of ideals or of concern for all mankind. Any scientist familiar with scientific personalities and conferences knows that a child-like enthusiasm for what he is doing will render the average scientist blind to all kinds of consequences and moral obligations, much as a group of fox-hunters will (unless watched) ignore damage done to farmers' lands. And in this state of excitement he feels nearer to a fellow scientist from some alien culture than he does to his fellow citizens who are not scientists. If this is wisdom and idealism so was Nero's enjoying chamber music with his fellow exquisites while Rome burnt.
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